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ABSTRACT
This article experimentally investigates the impact of recordkeeping over the level of direct reciprocity. The study of reciprocity 
has been barely explored in accounting. This article helps to fill that gap by presenting the first investigation that provides 
experimental evidence of the causal relationship between recordkeeping and direct reciprocity. Reciprocity is a key aspect 
in the human cooperation process, based on its implications for the evolution of economic and social systems. However, 
understanding the mechanisms that promote it has been an important scientific challenge in various areas, such as biology, 
anthropology, sociology, psychology, and economics. The results of this study have an impact on accounting teaching as they 
provide a scientific basis that helps to improve the understanding of the role of accounting, through its most basic function, and 
its consequences for human cooperation. Moreover, they have implications for accounting research by showing the viability 
of using economic experiments to investigate emerging themes in accounting. Finally, from a practical viewpoint, the results 
of the research signal to the formulators of accounting control mechanisms the importance of considering the crowding 
out effect of those instruments over motivation. The research adopted a single-factor between-subjects experimental design 
with a pre-test and post-test and a control group. The causal inference was made using difference-in-differences regression 
models for panel data together with a variety of additional tests, aiming to give robustness to the results. The research presents 
evidence of the crowding out effect of recordkeeping over direct reciprocity in a trust game. This finding is important because 
it provides an explanation of how accounting, through its most basic function, influences human cooperation.
Keywords: recordkeeping, direct reciprocity, crowding out effect, trust game.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Human cooperation is a prominent question in 
behavioral sciences, given that many collective problems 
are characterized by a conflict of interests (Gächter & 
Herrmann, 2009). Within that context, reciprocity 
performs an important role, as it promotes trust and 
cooperation in social interactions, increasing the chances 
of a relationship of mutual trust developing (Malhotra, 
2004). Moreover, reciprocity enables economic exchange 
relationships, helping to reduce transaction costs and 
the undesired consequences of incomplete contracts 
(Abraham et al., 2016; Barney & Hansen, 1995; Duffy et 
al., 2011; Gambetta, 1988).
Basu et al. (2009) were the first to study the role of formal 
recordkeeping in the evolution of cooperation, via its effect 
on reputation and reciprocity. The authors postulate that 
accounting, as an evolved economic institution, through its 
recordkeeping function, helps to promote the reciprocity 
needed for large scale exchanges and coordination in 
the interactions between strangers over time. Basu et al. 
(2009) presented experimental evidence suggesting that in 
the trust game with repeated interactions, recordkeeping 
alters the economic narrative by promoting reputation 
building and, as a result, reciprocity. According to the 
authors, their findings provide empirical support to the 
idea that institutions such as accounting can influence 
the propensity to act reciprocally and the cooperation 
between individuals. Basu et al. (2009) argue that this 
result occurs because recordkeeping, by complementing 
the resources of the brain, improves the memory of past 
interactions, meaning that the decisions regarding future 
interactions are conditioned by the partners’ history of 
cooperation. 
The findings of Basu et al. (2009) are compatible with 
those of other experimental studies that use the trust game 
with repeated interactions to address topics related to 
accounting [e.g., Lunawat (2013a, 2013b)]. However, due 
to the fact that they are configured for the participants to 
interact with different partners throughout the experiment 
and all the participants are informed of that condition 
at the start of the game, those studies create an incentive 
for strategic reputation building and emphasize indirect 
reciprocity, a situation in which the acts of one person 
toward another are rewarded/punished by third parties 
(Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009; Nowak & Sigmund, 
2005).
There is substantial literature suggesting that strategic 
reputation building induces increased competition [e.g., 
Abraham et al. (2016), Arnold and Schreiber (2013), 
Bohnet and Huck (2004), Brandts and Figueiras (2003), 
Camerer and Weigelt (1988), Engelmann and Fischbacher 
(2009), and Lunawat (2013a, 2013b)] and increases the 
efficiency of control mechanisms (Arnold & Schreiber, 
2013; Rockenbach & Milinski, 2006). For that reason, it 
is probable that, in the experiment of Basu et al. (2009), 
being able to use recordkeeping to differentiate those 
who do not cooperate, or cooperate little, will mean that 
there is strategic concern about reputation, since, in the 
scenario in which one individual interacts with various 
players at the same time, the evaluation that is made about 
the reputation of one particular partner is affected by the 
behavior of the rest, so that the appreciation of reputation 
will always be relative.
The study of Basu et al. (2009) derived its results from 
an environment strongly anchored in strategic reputation 
building, in which indirect reciprocity performs a 
fundamental role. However, the evolution of cooperation 
can change in scenarios in which the interactions 
predominantly occur in the form of direct reciprocity 
and strategic reputation building is not possible. Direct 
reciprocity is an interaction involving only two people, in 
which one directly responds to the actions of the other, in 
a process that necessarily repeats over time (Engelmann 
& Fischbacher, 2009; Hizak et al. 2018). It is based on the 
idea that the behavior of one partner directly depends on 
the behavior of their counterpart (Baek et al., 2016; Hilbe 
et al., 2017; Rand et al. 2009; Van Veelen et al., 2012) 
and it fundamentally relies on the individuals’ memory 
capacity (Milinski & Wedekind, 1998; Stevens & Hauser, 
2004). In smaller groups, in which repeated interaction 
is frequent, cooperation may be primarily explained by 
direct reciprocity (Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009).
On the other hand, recordkeeping, besides serving as 
a device for complementing memory, as argued by Basu 
et al. (2009), can work as a form of monitoring, acting 
as a control mechanism. Some studies have suggested 
that monitoring (like any other control mechanism) 
can reduce people’s intrinsic motivation to cooperate, 
depending on the context in which it is applied (Arnold 
& Schreiber, 2013; Calabuig et al., 2016; Camera & Casari, 
2017; Dickinson & Villeval, 2008; Enzle & Anderson, 
1993; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006; Fehr & List, 2004; Fehr & 
Rockenbach, 2003; Houser et al., 2008; Rietz et al., 2017), 
according to the phenomenon known as the “crowding 
out” effect.
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From that perspective, monitoring mechanisms can be 
interpreted as a hostile action (Falk & Kosfeld, 2006) or 
as a breach of the implicit contract based on mutual trust 
(Frey, 1993). When that occurs, the intrinsic motivation 
is eroded and the person monitored sees no impediment 
to behaving opportunistically and acting in their own 
self-interest (Frey, 1993). From the viewpoint of direct 
reciprocity, it is important to consider that aspect, given 
that, according to Frey (1993), the suppression of intrinsic 
motivation by external interventions, or the crowding 
out effect, will be stronger with direct and personal 
interactions.
Based on that scenario, the main aim of the present 
research was to investigate the effect of recordkeeping 
on direct reciprocity, considering the hypothesis that, 
in accordance with the crowding out effect, its use will 
negatively affect reciprocal exchange relationships. For 
that, a single-factor between-subjects experimental design 
was used, with a pre-test and post-test and a control group 
involving 64 undergraduate students, in a trust game 
environment with repeated interactions.
The main result documented presents evidence that 
recordkeeping reduces the propensity to form trust and, 
as a result, negatively affects the direct reciprocity when 
only that type of mechanism for promoting cooperation 
is possible. In the study, it was observed that, after the 
experimental manipulation, the level of reciprocity 
decreased, suggesting that the introduction of information 
records influenced the instrumental behavior of the 
trustees (player-B), making them reduce the return on the 
investments, probably in response to the perceived actions 
of the investors (player-A). The results show that, in the 
post-test, the mean of the values sent by the investors in 
the treatment group decreased and in the control group 
it increased.
The results are robust for a variety of statistical 
tests, but they differ from the one originally presented 
by Basu et al. (2009), since, while the latter identified 
that recordkeeping increased reciprocity, by promoting 
reputation building, this study recorded a reduction in 
the level of direct reciprocity. Taken together, however, 
these findings are complementary and suggest that 
recordkeeping, depending on the circumstances of 
the interactions between the agents, can have diverse 
consequences in the cooperation in accordance with the 
crowding out effect.
In general, the findings of this article are consistent 
with the hypothesis that formal recordkeeping negatively 
affects direct reciprocity and it presents the contributions 
highlighted below. As far as we are aware, it is the first 
study to directly offer an experimental test of the impact of 
recordkeeping over direct reciprocity, helping to broaden 
the understanding of the role of accounting, based on 
its most basic function in the development of economic 
exchanges. Second, by presenting the most robust causal 
inference of the relationship between recordkeeping and 
direct reciprocity, it increases the empirical evidence 
about the role of accounting, as an evolved institution, 
in influencing the economic and social behavior of the 
agents in exchange relationships. Third, studying the 
relationship between direct reciprocity and recordkeeping 
may have important implications for the research into 
management accounting, as a relevant body of studies 
has investigated how control mechanisms, particularly 
incentive contracts [e.g., Christ (2013), Christ et al. (2008), 
Hales and Williamson (2010), Kelly and Tan (2010), and 
Marinich (2019)], can influence cooperation in firms. 
Considering that, in certain circumstances, recordkeeping 
itself can serve as a monitoring mechanism, studying its 
impact on direct reciprocity helps to broaden the scope 
of those studies.
Finally, from a practical viewpoint, the results of the 
research indicate that the accounting control mechanisms 
may impede the evolution of cooperation if they are 
designed without considering the crowding out effect 
over people’s motivation.
Besides the Introduction, this article is constituted 
of four other parts, namely: section 2 summarizes 
the literature about the topic on which the research 
problem is based and develops the hypothesis; section 
3 presents the methodological description, as well as 
the experimental design and statistical procedures used 
to explore the data from the experiment; and section 
4 presents the results, together with the discussion of 
them. Finally, section 5 presents the conclusions of 
the study. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS
2.1 Definition of Direct Reciprocity
Reciprocity represents the responses that individuals 
give to the friendly or hostile actions of other people and 
it can be direct or indirect [for a more comprehensive 
discussion about the concept of reciprocity, consult 
Fehr and Schmidt (2006) and Sobel (2005)]. According 
to Nowak and Sigmund (2005), in the case of direct 
reciprocity, one person responds directly to the actions 
of another, rewarding or punishing them, in a process 
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of interactions that necessarily repeats various times. In 
the case of indirect reciprocity, the acts of one person 
toward another are responded to by third parties and are 
intrinsically linked to reputation building (Engelmann 
& Fischbacher, 2009; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Rankin 
& Eggimann, 2009; Roberts, 2008).
According to Baek et al. (2016), direct reciprocity is 
a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on 
repeated interactions. When individuals repeatedly come 
together, they may use conditional strategies to impose 
cooperative results that would not be viable in situations 
with a single interaction.
Nowak and Sigmund (2005) explain that in cases of 
direct reciprocity cooperation will be sustained through 
exchanges of altruistic acts. An act is considered altruistic 
if it has a cost, but confers a benefit to another individual. 
In that type of interaction, the reciprocal relationship is 
direct between the parties and does not involve third party 
participation, as in indirect reciprocity. For that reason, 
as Stanca et al. (2009) underline, how people evaluate 
underlying intentions in the actions of their counterpart 
is a fundamental question for understanding how direct 
reciprocity works. 
2.2 Recordkeeping, Reciprocity, and the 
Crowding Out Effect
Basu and Waymire (2006) argue that when people 
start to get involved in numerous and complex reciprocal 
exchanges, formal recordkeeping emerges to supplement 
the imperfect human memory, which cannot accurately 
keep track of the past behavior of many partners at the 
same time. For Basu et al. (2009), the simple ability to 
externally record exchanges can complement the memory 
resources of the brain, enabling the storage of information 
and a more effective memory of the past. At the same 
time, Mullins et al. (2013) emphasize that recordkeeping 
enables the data about transactions to be easily stored 
and recovered, serving as a guide for future reciprocal 
behaviors.
As Basu and Waymire (2006) clarify, accounting 
records institutionalize the memory of past transactions 
and, combined with norms of honesty incorporated into 
laws and other institutions, they serve to sustain the 
trust that enables reputation building and, consequently, 
cooperation between economic agents. For that reason, 
Basu et al. (2009) hypothesize that the possibility of 
recording exchanges externally increases the memory 
resources of the brain, widening the capacity to store 
and recover information from the past, thus promoting 
reciprocity.
Basu et al. (2009) examined the role of recordkeeping 
in the reputation building and reciprocal exchanges of an 
economy using the trust game with repeated interactions 
and they found support for the hypothesis that voluntary 
recordkeeping enables reputation building. According 
to Basu et al. (2009), the findings of the research are 
consistent with the archeological documents that suggest 
that records of pre-historic transactions and the invention 
of writing for recordkeeping were linked to an increase 
in the complexity of human interaction. 
On the other hand, according to the motivation 
crowding theory approach (Frey & Jegen, 2001), 
recordkeeping, understood as a monitoring system, may 
have an adverse psychological result and reduce intrinsic 
motivation, eliminating the positive effect of the control 
mechanism. That process of eroding intrinsic motivation, 
depending on an external intervention, is known as the 
crowding out effect (Frey 1993; Frey & Jegen, 2001).
Osterloh and Frey (2002) argue that contractual 
relationships include an aspect of (traditional) extrinsic 
motivation and a relational aspect, focused on a reciprocal 
appreciation of the intrinsic motivation. If the relational 
part of the contract is breached, the reciprocal good faith 
is put into question, so that if a particular act is interpreted 
as having a merely instrumental purpose, the intrinsic 
motivation will be weakened because it will be perceived 
as a form of control. However, Frey (1993) formulates 
that, in impersonal and purely abstract interactions, 
the intrinsic motivation will not be negatively affected 
by monitoring. The crowding out effect will be more 
probable in personal interactions. Dickinson and Villeval 
(2008) directly tested that hypothesis and found its 
empirical support.
2.3 Development of the Hypothesis
Arnold and Schreiber (2013) elaborated an experiment 
to analyze the efficiency of auditing in controlling the 
costs reported by subordinate managers in the budgeting 
process. The authors documented that, in a context in 
which the participants faced new partners in each round, 
aspects of reputation strongly affected the behavior of 
the parties, meaning the auditing favored a reduction in 
budgetary slack and an increase in the managers’ payoff. 
In contrast, in a scenario in which direct reciprocity was 
the standard, the control mechanism (auditing) had a 
different effect, as the benefits found in the previous 
scenario disappeared. According to the authors, the 
capacity of the subordinates to retaliate to their superiors’ 
previous punishments has negative effects and reduces 
the efficiency of the auditing. These results suggest that 
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in cases of direct reciprocity the social norms perform an 
important role and their non-observance can undermine 
the efficiency of the control mechanisms.
Moreover, the findings of Arnold and Schreiber 
(2013) are compatible with the arguments that control 
mechanisms (such as monetary incentives, supervision/
monitoring, the establishment of deadlines, competition, 
performance assessment, among others), under specific 
circumstances, can negatively influence people’s intrinsic 
motivation, altering their social behavior in accordance 
with the crowding out effect [for a more detailed study 
regarding that subject, see Deci and Ryan (1985), Deci 
et al. (1999), Frey (1993), and Frey and Jegen (2001)].
Along those lines, Calabuig et al. (2016), Fehr and 
List (2004), Fehr and Rockenbach (2003), and Houser 
et al. (2008) discovered that control mechanisms based 
on punishments can impede reciprocity. Dickinson and 
Villeval (2008), Enzle and Anderson (1993), and Falk 
and Kosfeld (2006) found evidence of the crowding out 
effect of monitoring over direct reciprocity. Conversely, 
Camera and Casari (2017) discovered that monitoring 
institutions lead to a reduction in cooperation.
Taken together, those studies indicate that monitoring, 
or any form of external intervention seen with the purpose 
of control, depending on the circumstances, can negatively 
affect motivation. Because in cases of direct reciprocity the 
interactions constitute relationships based on reciprocal 
altruistic exchanges, without involving the subjective 
evaluation of reputation, the presence of recordkeeping 
may be perceived as an external control intervention, 
causing the crowding out effect on intrinsic motivation. 
In the context of the trust game, the investor’s intrinsic 
motivation is trust and that of the trustee is the willingness 
to reciprocate the trust received (Calabuig et al., 2016). 
With that, the following prediction can be made:
H1: in environments with repeated interactions, the use of 
recordkeeping will reduce direct reciprocity.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Design and Experimental Protocol 
To test the previously mentioned hypothesis, 
this study uses an adaptation of the trust game with 
repeated interactions in a single-factor, pre-test/post-test 
experimental design, with a control group in which there 
is no other mechanism for promoting cooperation besides 
direct reciprocity. Moreover, unlike in the experiment 
of Basu et al. (2009), the players do not receive feedback 
about their partner’s decisions, so that the only way 
to accompany the evolution of the interactions is with 
human memory. However, that scenario changes in the 
recordkeeping condition, when the participants can 
keep notes about the interactions and know that their 
counterpart can also do so.
Another important aspect of the experimental design 
adopted is the fact that the monitoring is set exogenously 
and not as a decision of the investor. That characteristic 
is important because the investor may not indicate 
their intentions through any other means other than 
sending resources. That configuration avoids the investor 
strategically using “non-monitoring” to indicate trust and 
induce reciprocity in the trustee. 
As underlined by Campbell and Stanley (1963), 
the single-factor, pre-test/post-test and control group 
design adequately addresses the main threats that can 
traditionally compromise the internal validity of the 
experiment. 
As a result of the pre-test, the design used increases the 
experimental control because it eliminates or sensitively 
reduces the confounding variables, providing a high 
degree of internal validity, as well as making the causality 
analysis robust (Cozby & Bates, 2011; Salkind, 2010). 
Moreover, the pre-test/post-test design enables a more 
sensitive analysis of the effect of the treatment, because 
each participant serves as their own control, making the 
effect of the experimental manipulation more prominent. 
According to Libby et al. (2002), this type of design is more 
effective when the salience of the treatment is desirable 
from the viewpoint of the objectives of the experiment. 
In the case of the experimental procedure carried out, it 
was crucial for the participants to carefully understand 
the task proposed, especially the use of recordkeeping, to 
guarantee their adequate performance. In that sense, the 
pre-test served as a learning process for the participants. 
However, biases derived from the “demand 
characteristics” and “experimenter’s expectations” 
represent threats that need to be considered, even though 
the solutions available to mitigate them are partial, as it 
is impossible to impede the participants from generating 
their own hypotheses related to the research (Shadish et 
al., 2002).
Thus, the following actions were taken to try to mitigate 
the effects of such threats: the experimental section was 
externally monitored by the coordinators of the research, 
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but they did not have contact with the participants 
before the end of the section; someone was designated 
as responsible who did not have knowledge about what 
exactly was being researched to monitor the experimental 
section; that person was instructed to maintain the least 
contact possible with the participants (basically, their 
function was to read the instructions and note down any 
doubts to discuss with the coordinators of the research 
who were outside the room).
On the other hand, due to the characteristics of the 
participants and of the sample selection process, the 
external validity of the research is compromised, so that 
its results cannot be generalized beyond the group that 
participated in the experiment or to other circumstances 
and environments.
To execute the experiment, software was developed 
based on a variant of the trust game presented by Berg 
et al. (1995) with the inclusion of repeated interactions 
(rounds). In total, the experiment processed 20 rounds: 
10 in the pre-test and 10 in the post-test. The player 
pairs are the same until the end of the experiment. That 
characteristic of the game eliminates any possibility of 
reputation building via other mechanisms, other than 
the history of interactions between the same partners.
In the trust game used, the participants assume the role 
of investor (player-A) or trustee (player-B). Each player 
knows their own function, but does not know the function 
of any other participant. The game has two phases. In the 
first, the investor receives 10 currency units (lira), with 
the option of deciding the amount of the allowance they 
will keep and how much will be sent to the trustee. The 
investor keeps the entire resource that was not sent to the 
trustee. The allowance sent to the trustee is multiplied by 
3. In the second stage of the game, the trustee decides how 
much of the tripled amount received will be sent (from 0 
to the tripled quantity received) to the investor. At the end 
of each round, the investor’s return is the value retained, 
that is, not sent to the trustee, plus the quantity received 
from the trustee. The trustee’ profit, in turn, is the value 
received minus the quantity sent to the investor.
The participants were recruited among the students 
of the undergraduate course in accounting sciences of 
a public university of the state of Bahia. The promotion 
occurred through social media, banners, and email lists 
of the institution itself. During the recruitment phase, the 
participants were informed that the experimental section 
would consist of two activities (one presentation and one 
task) and would last between 90 and 150 minutes. At the 
time, it was also clarified that the details about the task 
would be given on the day of the experimental session 
and that they would receive credits in complementary 
activities for their participation.
It is important to highlight that, at the faculty in which 
the research was carried out, there is no human research 
ethics committee, but studies conducted within the scope 
of its post-graduate program (as is the case here) undergo 
deliberation by the board. However, precisely because 
of that, during the act of recruiting, the students were 
duly informed about all the procedures that would be 
adopted in the experimental section, the objectives of the 
research, and the risks involved, among other relevant 
information. Moreover, as a rule, participation in the 
research would only be possible with the expressed 
consent of the participants.
Initially, the experimental session was formed of 64 
students, each one randomly allocated as an investor or 
trustee, constituting 32 pairs. No student knew who their 
partner was. Next, the pairs were randomly separated 
into two groups (one for each experimental condition): 
treatment and control. In the treatment condition 
(recordkeeping), as of the 11th round, the participants 
had access to a text box on the screen of their computer 
in which they were supposed to make the alphanumerical 
records referring to the transactions with their partner. 
It was informed that making the records was a necessary 
condition for performing the task and that the information 
would be kept and could be consulted at any time.
Thus, it was possible to investigate the qualitative 
behavior (recordkeeping strategy) and quantitative 
behavior (number of characters) of the participants in 
the experiment. It was noted that the participants generally 
used recordkeeping to register information about the 
values sent and, primarily, those received by their partner 
in the game.
Before starting the experiment, the participants signed 
an attendance list. After distribution to the groups, the 
participants were duly seated at the computer terminals 
and received the initial instructions of the game. Next, the 
coordinator of the session made the presentation using 
a video projector to explain the experimental system.
The software was operated on the investors’ computers 
with the purpose of storing the data generated throughout 
the experiment. Each pair’s computers were linked up 
using an IP (internet protocol) after creating the game. 
The machines were numbered to enable the control and 
composition of the pairs. When starting the experimental 
section, the participants did not know the number of 
rounds the game would have. After the first round, the 
participants were informed that the game would have 
nine rounds. That aspect is important because it has an 
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implication in the measurement of the proxy used to 
operationalize the direct reciprocity construct. 
At the start of the experiment, the participants accessed 
the initial screen of the game, related to registration of 
personal information, which enabled identification at 
the moment of searching the data in the game server, as 
well as reconciliation with the enrollment information. 
At the end of registration, the screen directed them to 
the start of the game. At that point, the participants could 
no longer communicate with each other or consult any 
material, being conditioned to only communicate with 
the moderator of the game.
In the first 10 rounds, both groups operated in the 
same way. From the 11th to the 20th round, the treatment 
group used recordkeeping. When they concluded the 20th 
round, the participants received a communication from 
the system itself about the end of the game, revealing the 
final balance obtained.
3.2 Participants and Incentive Structure
When working with students, the incentive often used 
in experiments in accounting, above all with the trust 
game and investment game, is monetary [e.g., Basu et al. 
(2009), Kanagaretnam et al. (2014), Lunawat (2016), and 
Maas et al. (2012)]. However, in the experiment developed, 
credits in complementary activities were offered to the 
participants. According to Slonim et al. (2013), incentives 
in the form of academic credits are just as powerful as 
monetary resources, for the purpose of attracting students 
to participate in experiments.
At the university where the experiment was developed, 
students who participate in courses, activities, and 
institutional programs involving research, teaching, and 
extension can have their participation converted into 
curricular hours, at the discretion of the course panel. 
The time of participation in the experiment was divided 
as follows: hours of participation in presentations and 
hours of participation in the production of the extension 
activity.
3.3 Variables, Measurement, and Empirical-
Statistical Model
The two main variables of the empirical model are 
direct reciprocity (abbreviated as Recip) and recordkeeping 
(abbreviated as Rk). As a construct is concerned, 
reciprocity will be operationalized using the values sent 
by the trustees throughout the 20 rounds. This form of 
operationalization of the construct is compatible with 
previous studies [e.g., Berg et al. (1995), Charness and 
Shmidov (2014), Cox (2004), Engle-Warnick and Slonim 
(2004), and Glaeser (2000)].
In turn, the treatment was operationalized using a 
dummy variable where 0 and 1 indicate the absence and 
the presence of the treatment, respectively. With that, the 
empirical model of the research will be formed of two 
main variables: reciprocity (Recip) and recordkeeping 
(Rk).
The main analysis will be carried out based on the 
following difference in differences (Diff-in-Diff) regression 
model described in equation 1:
 
𝑅𝑅���𝐷𝐷 � ���� � �����𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷� � �����𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅� � �����𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 � 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅� � ��� (1) 
 
 in which Recip is the dependent variable of the model, 
a proxy for direct reciprocity, the value sent by the 
trustees in each round; (i) with relation to the parameters 
of the model, β0 represents the expected value of the 
Recip variable related to the control group before the 
experimental manipulation, β1 indicates how Recip behaves 
after the experimental manipulation and measures the 
difference (before and after) within the control group, β2 
measures the marginal effect of belonging to the treatment 
group before the experimental manipulation, and β3 is the 
difference in differences (the difference within the control 
group minus the difference within the treatment group) 
and measures the effect of the treatment on the variable 
being studied; (ii) εi is the error term of the stochastic 
model; (iii) Dp is the dummy variable, which will be 1 
when the data refer to the post-treatment and 0 when the 
data refer to the pre-treatment period; (iv) Rk is a dummy 
variable that will equal 1 when the participant is in the 
treatment group and 0 in the other situation.
The interest lies in the β3 coefficient. According to the 
formulated hypothesis, it is expected to be significantly 
different from 0. 
1
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4. RESULTS
4.1 Evaluation of the Trust Game
To better understand the effect of recordkeeping on 
reciprocity, it is important to analyze how the trust and 
reciprocity relationships developed in the experiment 
conducted. The descriptive data reported below serve 
that purpose.
All in all, 32 pairs participated in the experiment, 
formed of 64 undergraduate students of the Accounting 
Sciences Faculty of the Federal University of Bahia. Of 
that total, 16 pairs were randomly allocated to each 
experimental group. However, in the treatment group, 
four pairs were excluded from the analyses because they 
did not comply with the rules of the experiment task, as 
instructed, meaning the final sample was formed of 28 
pairs (16 in the control group and 12 in the treatment 
group). With that configuration, 28 students performed 
the role of trustee and 28 performed the role of investor. 
Table 1 shows the summary of the demographic profile 
of the participants who performed the role of trustee and 
investor throughout the experiment. 
Table 1 
Demographic profile of the participants
Trustees Investors
Profile Control group Treatment group Total Control group Treatment group Total
Women 8 6 14 8 5 13
Men 8 6 14 8 7 15
Mean age 26.6 28.1 28 26.5 27.4 28
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
A total of 560 decisions were taken for sending 
resources from the investors to the trustees and 560 were 
taken for sending them from the trustees to the investors. 
In only 11 investor decisions and 20 trustee decisions 
was the value sent 0 (1.96 and 3.57%, respectively). These 
percentages indicate that there was a high frequency of 
expression of trust and reciprocity. 
On average, at the end of 20 rounds, each investor 
accumulated 265.18 liras and each trustee accumulated 
171.53 liras. This difference between accumulated values 
is due to the investors starting with a 10 liras endowment 
in each round. The lowest and the highest values observed 
among the trustees were 57 and 311 liras. Among the 
investors, those values were 181 and 477. In equilibrium, 
the maximum value that each trustee or investor could 
earn would be 300 liras and for the duo, adding together 
the gains, it would be 600 liras. The maximum one pair 
managed to earn was 570 (311 for the trustee and 359 for 
the investor). Of the 28 pairs, the trustee accumulated a 
higher gain than the investor in only five.
The mean value sent by the investors, per round, was 
approximately 5.88 liras. Conversely, the mean value 
returned by the trustees was 9.21 liras. On average, the 
investors sent 58.8% of the value available in each round 
and the trustees returned 50% of the values received. 
Altogether, these findings are compatible with those 
recorded in many experiments involving the trust game 
[see Johnson and Mislin (2010)].
With relation to the use of recordkeeping, it was 
possible to note that up to the 16th round, the participants 
added a large volume of information in each round. 
However, in the following rounds, there was a reduction 
in the inclusion of new characters. Therefore, it is possible 
to conjecture that the participants, as of the 17th round, 
were satisfied with the information accumulated, which 
enabled an understanding of the profile of their game 
partner. Among the trustees (player B), 12,700 characters 
were recorded, including the spaces between numbers and 
words [mean of 60.47 per round, standard deviation (SD) 
of 71, and median of 25.5]. The highest (lowest) extension 
record contained 206 (0) characters.
The main analysis of the research focused on the 
trustees’ decisions and, therefore, took into account the 
amount of resources returned to the investors (return 
from the trustees) because it serves as a proxy for the 
direct reciprocity measure. However, the value sent by 
the investors is also important for understanding the 
dynamics of the experiment because it serves as a proxy 
for trust. Table 2 records the main descriptive statistics by 
experimental group for each one of the variables. Table 3 
reveals the mean of the values sent per round before and 
after the experimental manipulation.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics of the values sent and returned throughout the sections
Statistics

















Mean 8.29 9.92 9.63 8.94 5.55 6.21 5.99 5.94
Standard 
error
0.48 1.23 0.51 0.57 0.22 0.24 0.29 0.30
Median 8.72 10.31 9.46 8.92 5.00 7.00 6.00 6.00
Standard 
deviation
1.52 3.89 1.61 1.79 2.82 3.00 3.16 3.28
Variance 2.30 15.16 2.59 3.20 7.97 9.01 9.96 10.78
Kurtosis -1.36 -0.54 0.08 -0.77 -1.14 -1.19 -1.26 -1.22
Asymmetry -0.39 0.27 -0.01 0.34 0.01 -0.34 -0.18 -0.26
Minimum 5.75 4.63 6.75 6.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 10.19 16.88 12.33 12.08 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Table 3
Mean of the values returned and sent by the trustees and investors, respectively, by round and groups


















1 5.75 4.63 6.75 10.17 4.13 6.25 4.33 6.08
2 6.81 10.69 10.08 7.75 4.56 6.88 5.67 5.67
3 7.06 7.81 8.83 6.50 4.13 6.38 5.33 5.17
4 9.19 11.63 8.67 10.83 5.31 6.13 5.17 4.83
5 7.06 6.63 12.33 9.75 6.00 7.19 7.00 4.58
6 8.25 9.94 8.50 8.75 5.63 6.06 5.58 6.17
7 10.19 5.25 9.25 7.17 6.38 6.00 6.50 4.33
8 9.69 11.88 9.67 7.33 6.50 5.63 5.92 6.08
9 9.56 13.88 11.25 9.08 6.25 5.44 7.25 9.17
10 9.31 16.88 11.00 12.08 6.63 6.19 7.17 7.33
Mean 8.29 9.92 9.63 8.94 5.55 6.21 5.99 5.94
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Tables 2 and 3 show that, between the pre-test 
and the post-test, in the control group, the amount 
returned by the trustees increased approximately 
19.93% (statistically significant, two-tailed Wilcoxon 
test p-value of 0.04) and in the treatment group there 
was a reduction of approximately 7.16% (statistically 
non-significant). Observing the SD in Table 2, it is 
noted that the dispersion before the experimental 
manipulation is exactly equal between the groups 
(SD = 2.1). However, after the manipulation, the SD 
increased approximately 16 and 15% in the control and 
treatment groups, respectively.
The data description also reveals that in the control 
group the amount of resources sent by the investors rose 
approximately 11.94% between the pre-test and the post-
test. That difference is statistically significant (p-value of 
0.006 for the two-tailed Wilcoxon non-parametric test). 
Conversely, in the treatment group, there was a slight 
alteration (not significant, from a statistical viewpoint), 
as a decline of approximately 0.83% was observed. The 
alteration in the variance was also accentuated. However, 
the difference in differences is statistically significant 
(Mann-Whitney U test with a p-value of 0.03), suggesting 
a treatment effect on trust. The difference in differences is 
calculated as follows: [(mean of the control group in the 
post-test) – (mean of the control group in the pre-test)] – 
[(mean of the treatment group in the post-test) – (mean 
of the treatment group in the pre-test)]. 
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As the trustees’ returns may be explained by aversion 
to iniquity or pure altruism (Engelmann & Strobel, 2010; 
Fehr & Schmidt, 2006; Rabin, 1993; Smith, 2013), it is 
necessary to make an inference about the presence of 
reciprocity motivated by other factors conditioned by 
the investor’s behavior in the experiment. According 
to Coricelli et al. (2006), if the trustee’s return is simply 
motivated by pure altruism, then it should not depend 
on the investor’s level of trust. However, Berg et al. 
(1995) argue that reciprocity can be explained by the 
trust that one agent receives from an anonymous 
counterpart, that is, the trustee’s reciprocity depends 
on the investor’s trust. So, in the reciprocity hypothesis, 
the proportion returned by the trustee will be positively 
related with the quantity sent by the investor (Cochard 
et al., 2004). To evaluate these conjectures, Table 4 
shows the contemporaneous correlation between trust 
and reciprocity.
Table 4
Correlation between trust and reciprocity in the experimental conditions
Control group before Control group after Treatment group before Treatment group after
Correlation between 
reciprocity and trust
0.70*** 0.70*** 0.78*** 0.68***
Note: Reciprocity is represented by the value sent from the trustee to the investor and trust is represented by the value sent from 
the investor to the trustee. The results reported refer to the Pearson correlations; however, Spearman’s correlations were run, 
which were also significant at 1%, and whose results were omitted. 
*** = significant at 1%. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The data in Table 4 reveal the high contemporaneous 
correlation between trust and reciprocity in all the periods, 
but with a reduction of approximately 12.8% between the 
pre-test and the post-test in the treatment group and no 
alteration in the control group.
Taken together, these findings confirm the presence of 
reciprocity in the experiment and present the following 
situation: in the control group, the trustees returned an 
average of 49.72 and 53.13% of the resources received before 
and after the experimental manipulation, respectively. In 
the treatment group, in turn, those percentages were 53.59 
and 50.16%. Those percentages are calculated as follows: 
(mean value returned by the trustee) ÷ (mean value sent 
by the investor × 3).
These results indicate that, in the control group, 
there was a practically equitable distribution of the 
gains for the increase in investor return. Conversely, in 
the treatment group, the scenario did not change, since 
in the post-test the division of gains was practically 
the same. 
In short, the pattern of reciprocity and trust 
documented in this article is compatible with the findings 
of other studies involving the trust game [e.g., Basu et 
al. (2009), Berg et al. (1995), Bourgeois-Gironde and 
Corcos (2011), Cameron (2003), Cochard et al. (2004), 
Coricelli et al. (2006), Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2004, 
2006a, 2006b), Johnsen and Kvaløy (2016), and Johnson 
and Mislin (2010)] and it indicates the adequacy of the 
experiment.
4.2 Effect of Recordkeeping over Direct 
Reciprocity
Due to the experimental design used, one preceding 
question to be observed in the data from the experiment is 
whether the control and experimental groups are equivalent 
in the pre-test. That equivalence should be evaluated in 
relation to the dependent variable. In this case, due to the 
random attribution to the groups, these are expected to 
be statistically equal in relation to the mean of the values 
observed for the Recip variable. The two-tailed Mann-
Whitney U test indicates a p-value of 0.16, suggesting that 
in the pre-test the difference between the experimental 
groups is not significant from a statistical viewpoint.
In addition, the equivalence of the groups was also 
evaluated in relation to the trustees’ returns (proxy for 
reciprocity) and to the values sent by the investors (proxy 
for trust). In both cases, in the pre-test, the control and 
treatment groups do not present statistically significant 
differences (p-values in the two-tailed Mann-Whitney U 
test of 0.17 and 0.38, respectively). Hence, equivalence 
between the groups is assumed. 
To test the research hypothesis, equation 1, as 
already detailed in section 3, was used. Considering the 
longitudinal data structure, two panel data regression 
models were run (pooled and random effect). In addition, 
due to the relaxation of the assumption of normality 
of the residuals of the regression, an additional test 
was carried out using the bootstrapping resampling 
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procedure, simulating normality of the residuals based 
on the pooled regression. Table 5 presents the results of 
the regressions that test the effect of the recordkeeping 
over direct reciprocity.
Table 5
Results of the panel data regression for the Recip independent variable 
Variables Statistics Pooled (OLS) Random effect (GLS) Bootstrapping simulating normal errors
Constant
Coefficient 8.27*** 8.27*** 8.27***
Standard error 0.39 1.12 -
Z-score 21.38 7.39 -
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rk
Coefficient 1.36** 1.36 1.36**
Standard error 0.62 1.80 -
Z-score 2.19 0.76 -
p-value 0.03 0.45 0.03
Dp
Coefficient 1.61*** 1.61*** 1.61***
Standard error 0.55 0.55 -
Z-score 2.95 2.95 -
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dp x Rk
Coefficient -2.30*** -2.30*** -2.30***
Standard error 0.88 0.88 -
Z-score -2.61 -2.61 -
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 560 560 5,000
Adjusted R2 0.009 - -
Durbin-Watson 0.87 1.545 -
Variance “between” - 20.22 -
Variance “within” - 27.40 -
F statistic/(p-value) 3.39/(0.03) - -
Note: Due to there being repeated observations for the same individual in the sample, the regressions used Beck-Katz robust 
standard errors (panel-corrected standard errors – PCSE) to correct any possible intra-individual correlations, heteroscedasticity 
between the groups, and contemporaneous correlations. The intercept (constant) reflects the measurement of the variable being 
studied for the control group before the treatment. Rk is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when referring to the treatment 
group and 0 in other cases, Dp is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the data refer to the post-treatment period and 
0 for the pre-treatment period, Dp x Rk indicates the effect of the treatment, and the dependent variable Recip represents the 
mean value sent by the trustees in the environment of repeated interactions. The pooled regressions and those with random 
effects relaxed the assumption of normality of the residuals. So, the decision was made to estimate the p-value of the coefficients 
simulating normality of the residuals via the bootstrapping technique using 5,000 replications.
*, **, *** = significant at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively.
GLS = generalized least squares; OLS = ordinary least squares.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
In the regression of Table 5, the coefficient of the 
constant (8.27) represents the mean of the values sent by 
the trustees of the control group before the experimental 
manipulation, serving as the basis for comparison. The 
coefficient of the Rk variable (1.36) is the mean marginal 
value of the amounts sent by the trustees of the treatment 
group before the experimental manipulation. The 
coefficient of the Dp variable (1.61) is the mean marginal 
value of the amounts sent by the trustees of the control 
group after the experimental manipulation. Finally, the 
coefficient of the Dp x Rk variable (-2.30) is the difference 
in differences between the control and treatment groups 
and measures the treatment effect.
As is observed, the coefficient of Dp x Rk is negative and 
significant in the two main models and in the bootstrapping 
simulation of normality of the residuals. Also due to the 
relaxation of the normality assumption, a non-parametric 
test of the difference in differences was run, which indicated 
a statistically significant difference between the groups 
(p-value of 0.002 for the Mann-Whitney U test).
The experiment indicates that the recordkeeping 
caused a crowding out effect, reducing the level of direct 
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reciprocity, probably in response to the investor’s trust. 
However, the sensitivity of the variation was greater in 
the treatment group, given that in the control group the 
11.94% increase in the level of trust (recorded in Table 2) 
caused a 71.94% increase in the level of reciprocity (ratio 
of 6.03). Conversely, in the control group, the 0.83% 
reduction in trust led to a 21.26% reduction in reciprocity 
(ratio of 25.48). Clearly, the leverage was greater in the 
treatment group.
The fact that the investors did not alter the mean value 
sent to the trustees may explain the decline in reciprocity 
in the post-test of the treatment group. From the trustees’ 
viewpoint, the variation in trust represents a variation 
in their gains. If, over the course of the experiment, the 
level of trust remains the same, by reducing reciprocity, 
the trustees can increase their wealth. In fact, in the 
experiment, in the treatment group, the mean gain per 
round for the trustees was 83.42 and 88.83 in the pre-
test and post-test, respectively. Among the investors, 
that gain was 136.42 and 130.00 before and after the 
treatment, respectively. This suggests that the trustees 
acted strategically to increase their gains and punish the 
investors for breaching their trust. 
Taken together, these results indicate the treatment 
effect, as the direct reciprocity decreased in the post-test, 
suggesting the crowding out effect of recordkeeping. 
This finding is compatible with other studies that show 
the crowding out effect of the monitoring mechanisms 
(Dickinson & Villeval, 2008; Enzle & Anderson, 1993; 
Frey, 1993; Rietz et al., 2017), but differs from the finding 
of Basu et al. (2009), who documented an increase in 
reputation.
In this aspect, it is important to highlight that, despite 
being complementary, the findings of this research 
cannot be directly compared with those of Basu et al. 
(2009), given that the latter emphasized reputation 
building. As previously discussed, it is probable that the 
mechanism for strategic reputation building improves 
the efficiency of recordkeeping as a control mechanism. 
In the experimental configuration of Basu et al. (2009), 
the trustees could offer higher returns to those investors 
who made greater investments to strategically build their 
reputation. In that scenario, there would be a natural 
tendency to maintain high returns for the investors, 
as reputation increases every time return increases. 
Similarly, the investors could prioritize those trustees 
who offered the highest returns. Moreover, as argued by 
Frey (1993), the crowding out effect will probably not 
occur in impersonal or purely abstract interactions (as is 
the case of interactions based on subjective evaluations 
of reputation).
Also in relation to the results, with the GPower 3.1 
software, a post hoc analysis was made of the statistical power 
relative to the non-parametric difference in differences 
test, as previously reported (two-tailed Mann-Whitney 
U p-value of 0.002). To facilitate the understanding, we 
chose to analyze only the non-parametric test because it 
involves a direct test for comparing groups.
Considering the p-value of 0.002 with the means of 
1.61 and -0.69 (corresponding to the difference between 
the pre-test and the post-test) of the control and treatment 
groups, respectively, the grouped SD of 7.72, and using the 
minimum asymptotic relative efficiency (ARE) method, 
an effect size of approximately 0.30 and power of 0.74 
were computed. According to the standards usually used, 
considering the Cohen’s d, the size found is small.
With that, based on the sizes of the groups that served 
as the basis for the study (160 and 120), to achieve a 
power of 80%, for example, an effect size of 0.32 would 
be necessary. Conversely, considering the effect size 
actually found, a power of 80% would be obtained with 
the following minimum group sizes: 190 and 142 for the 
treatment and control, respectively.
4.3 Additional Analysis
Additionally, due to trust also explaining reciprocal 
behavior (as was revealed in the experiment) and the fact 
that some studies have suggested that gender can influence 
reciprocity [e.g., Buchan et al. (2008), Chaudhuri and Sbai 
(2011), Croson et al. (2008), and Dittrich (2015)], a new 
regression was run based on equation 1, in which these 
controls are included. The results of the new regression 
are revealed in Table 6.
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Table 6 
Results of the panel data regression for the Recip independent variable 
Variables Statistics Pooled (OLS) Random effect (GLS) VIF
Constant
Coefficient -0.31 0.59















Standard error 0.61 0.63




Standard error 0.35 1.16




Standard error 0.06 0.06 1.00
Z-score 24.64 22.83
p-value 0.00 0.00
Adjusted R2 0.50 - -
Durbin-Watson 1.35 2.05 -
Variance “between” - 8.07 -
Variance “within” - 15.58 -
F statistic/(p-value) 132.49/(0.00) - -
Note: Due to there being repeated observations for the same individual in the sample, the regressions used Beck-Katz robust 
standard errors (panel-corrected standard errors – PCSE) to correct any possible intra-individual correlations, heteroscedasticity 
between the groups, and contemporaneous correlations. The intercept (constant) reflects the measurement of the variable being 
studied for the control group before the treatment. Rk is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when referring to the treatment 
group and 0 in other cases, Dp is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the data refer to the post-treatment period and 
0 for the pre-treatment period, Dp x Rk indicates the effect of the treatment, the dependent variable Recip represents the mean 
value sent by the trustees in the environment of repeated interactions, the Trust variable is measured by the amount of resources 
that the investor sends to the trustee, and Gender is a dummy variable where 1 represents the male gender and 0 represents the 
female gender.
*, **, *** = significant at 10, 5, and 1%, respectively.
GLS = generalized least squares; OLS = ordinary least squares; VIF = variance inflation factor.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The results in Table 6 show that the inclusion 
of the control variables improved the model, giving 
more robustness to the estimates with an expressive 
increase in the explanatory power (adjusted R2 of 
0.50). Moreover, the variable of interest continues to 
be significant at 5%. The gender variable did not present 
significance. Furthermore, confirming the prediction 
of the literature, trust is positively correlated with 
reciprocity in both models. This result serves to confirm 
that, even controlling for trust, recordkeeping had an 
effect on direct reciprocity, suggesting the presence of 
the crowding out effect.
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5. CONCLUSION
As highlighted by Mullins et al. (2013), recent studies 
derived from behavioral economics, paleography, 
evolutionary psychology, and anthropology suggest that 
recordkeeping helps to resolve the problem of cooperation 
in large groups, transcending the serious limitations of our 
psychology evolved through the promotion of reciprocal 
behaviors and reputation building and maintenance. 
However, that is only true in specific circumstances, 
given the crowding out effect of recordkeeping over direct 
reciprocity documented in this study.
In general, the results presented reinforce the idea 
that, contemporarily, reciprocity works as a response 
to trust and serves as a predictor of future trust, as 
widely documented in previous experimental studies. 
Specifically, the experimental manipulation had an effect 
on the instrumental behavior of the participants that 
performed the role of trustee, reducing the efficiency 
of cooperation, given that the mean marginal return of 
the trustees for the investors decreased in the post-test. 
These findings give support to the hypothesis raised in 
the research and are important because they show that 
recordkeeping influences the instrumental behavior of 
individuals based on self-interest.
As conjectured by Basu et al. (2009), it is probable 
that, by improving the memory of past interactions, 
the recording of information about the transactions 
influenced the subjective evaluation that the trustees made 
of the investors’ real intentions, leading them to strongly 
reduce their propensity for reciprocity in the search to 
increase their gains and punish their counterpart for 
breaching the social contract (reciprocity norm). Based 
on what occurred in the control group, it was expected 
that in the treatment group there would be an increase in 
the resources sent to the trustees. However, a reduction 
occurred, signaling a possible crowding out effect of 
recordkeeping in the environment in which only direct 
reciprocity is possible.
Taken together, the findings documented in this study 
serve to show the evolutionary role of accounting, even 
in its most basic function, and they are consistent with 
the idea defended by Waymire and Basu (2008) that 
this involves an evolved economic institution capable 
of influencing the pattern of human cooperation. For 
that reason, they have important practical implications, 
because they indicate that accounting control mechanisms 
can have adverse effects on human behavior if the social 
context in which they are applied is not considered.
However, the results of this research need to be 
considered in light of some restrictions. For example, 
extracurricular credits were used as an incentive 
mechanism. Even with the support of the literature for 
their use, compensating the participants with money 
could work as a more powerful incentive, affecting the 
individuals’ level of commitment, as various studies 
involving the trust game have shown. Another limitation 
was not having evaluated the effect of the pre-test on the 
behavior of the treatment group. Future research could 
use an experimental design, such as the Solomon four-
group design, to try to identify if that problem occurs.
Also within the field of suggestions for future research, 
some studies have documented that in environments 
with repeated interactions instrumental reciprocity is 
one of the main factors that explain the cooperative 
behavior of individuals (Cabral et al., 2014; Dreber et al. 
2014). For that reason, it would be interesting for new 
studies to try to evaluate the effect of recordkeeping over 
instrumental reciprocity. Moreover, it is important for 
new studies to evaluate the role of altruism and aversion 
to inequality in the relationship between recordkeeping 
and reciprocity.
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